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Summary 
As a result of the rise in the raw materials market of 2007-08, steel-producing 
companies are re-thinking their purchasing of iron ore. Integration of upstream mining 
companies is one option for ensuring the supply of raw materials. This trend is being 
pursued mostly in the up-and-coming industrial companies of newly industrializing 
countries. In contrast, the steel companies of mature industrial countries are continuing 
to rely on the market. This variation in company strategies cannot be explained by 
current theories of vertical integration such as the Transaction Cost approach and the 
Global Value Chain approach. This only becomes possible by considering the diverse 
macroeconomic environment, which is characterized by high profit margins and high 
investment in the newly industrializing countries. Theoretically, this requires us to 
borrow arguments from FRANÇOIS PERROUX'S Polarization Theory and arguments from 
ANDREAS PREDÖHL'S theory of Economic Area Development. This paper contains an 
empirical investigation of vertical integration based on the steel and iron ore industries, 
and uses an Indian and a Chinese company as examples. 
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1. Introduction  
In February 2008, the Aluminium Corporation of China (“Chinalco”) bought stock in 
the world’s third largest mining company, Rio Tinto. Chinalco paid US $ 14 billion for 
their 9% share of Rio Tinto stocks, at that time the highest direct foreign investment by 
a Chinese company. One year later, Chinalco wanted to increase its share from 9% to 
21%. Both companies announced a strategic partnership through the creation of joint 
ventures in aluminium, copper, and iron ore. However, this share was not realized, due 
to an agreement in June 2009 between Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, the world’s second 
largest mining company, which covered the entirety of both companies' Western 
Australian iron ore assets. What followed was a tough conflict between Chinalco and 
Rio Tinto, which has included diplomatic complications – and the arrest of four Rio 
Tinto employees in Shanghai – in July 2009. The first sign of a relaxation of the 
situation occurred in March of 2010, when Chinalco and Rio Tinto announced a joint 
running of operations in Guinea in western Africa. This shows how deeply economic 
interests are interwoven with strategic geographical interests and political means. 
Nevertheless, Chinalco is still the largest Rio Tinto shareholder, and this failed financial 
operation is only one incident in a series of otherwise successful takeovers in the mining 
industry by Chinese companies.  
More interesting than the political turbulences are the changes in business strategies in 
the metal industry. CHINALCO (2009, 13) clearly states that it is following a strategy of 
vertical integration from upstream mining to processing and downstream fabricated 
products. There are many more metal firms that have adopted a similar strategy in the 
last few years, and nearly all of them have their roots in Asia. This raises the question of 
why the strategy of vertical integration is gaining ground in the metal industry and why 
this is happening mostly in Asia. Are such developments simply exceptions, or do they 
point towards a general trend for the 21st century? Some light is thrown onto these 
questions by the example of the steel industry, by far the most significant of the metal 
industries.  
The following text is divided into seven parts. First, the discussion of economic 
geography in vertical integration is revisited (2.).  Then, economic trends and features of 
the steel industry (3.) and the market for iron ore is discussed (4.). In the main part, 
business strategies of a European, a Chinese and an Indian steel company are described 
(5.). After this, reasons for the different strategy in Asia are discussed (6.). Finally, the 
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trend to vertical integration in the steel industry will be set within the more general 
framework of economic geography (7.). The analysis ends with some concluding 
thoughts (8.).  
2. Vertical Integration  
Every type of production can be seen as a material flow from raw materials to the final 
product. Hence, the different segments of a commodity chain may be handled by one 
actor or by many actors. The field of economic geography has, since ALFRED WEBER 
(1909) at the earliest, dealt with the physical value creation chain and its influence on 
locations. However, Weber only considered the economically efficient flow of material 
and did not show any interest in the structure of proprietary rights. This was more the 
area of economists such as ALFRED MARSHALL (1920), who highly valued the 
advantages of vertical integration within a company and predicted the triumphal 
procession of large companies. In particular, focus was placed on the development of 
the advantages of vertical integration, such as saving transport costs, faster and more 
secure access to primary products, utilizing resources to their full capacity and 
protection of quality, synergy effects across the various levels up the value chain as well 
as the protection of trade knowledge and secrets. It was only when the leading industrial 
conglomerates began to experience economic crises in the 1970s that vertical integration 
began to be treated as a problem of economic geography. In the past 30 years, other 
efficient solutions and changes to the value creation chain have shifted into focus. At 
the same time, the “California school of external economies” , which draws on RONALD 
COASE and OLIVER WILLIAMSON’S Transaction Cost Approach (SCOTT 1988; STORPER 
1997), was particularly influential in the field of economic geography.  According to this 
approach, specific forms and amounts of transaction costs, such as search costs, 
bargaining costs or enforcement costs arise. It stipulates that the transactions differ 
according to how safely, frequently and specifically they can be arranged. While some 
activities can be carried out cheaply in-house, others should be carried out by external 
specialists, resulting in an optimum ratio of internal and external costs in each sector 
(SCOTT 1988, 38). This leads to entrepreneurial strategies of vertical (dis)integration, 
which have been very widely expanded. This means that vertical integration in a big 
company can be accompanied by establishing various locations of operation. 
Conversely, vertical disintegration can also be linked to clustering, as for example 
MICHAEL STORPER and SUSAN CHRISTOPHERSON (1987) have shown in relation to the 
US film industry. 
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The “California school of external economies” adopts both the Transaction Cost 
Approach and the historic tendency to support smaller and more flexible companies 
working in regional production networks (SCOTT 1998, 100). This theory holds that 
various sectors and regions show a tendency towards vertical disintegration, providing a 
more efficient production model. It is at this point that this theory converges with the 
statements of the Theory of Flexible Specialization (PIORE and SABEL 1984) and of the 
Post-Fordist debate. A similar point of view was represented in industrial economics by 
the Core Competencies Approach (PRAHALAD and HAMEL 1990), which recommends a 
moderate outsourcing policy. These approaches have also strengthened convictions in 
the field of economic geography that the vertical disintegration tendency is unstoppable 
and that in the future, only virtual and boundary-less companies will be successful.  
However, globalization of the markets in the 1990s was accompanied by the 
development of new, strongly opposing forces. Multinational companies in particular 
were able to make use of new opportunities. They sent their operational functions to 
those different locations that were best suited to handle the respective functions. This 
tendency to internal growth can, in part, be explained by the wish to avoid transaction 
problems that arise from global business relations and can be solved more easily in-
house. In addition to this, the theory of the Global Value Chain (GVC) has focused on 
tracing the different distributions of power in a value chain. This requires an indirect 
inquiry into the issues of vertical integration, particularly into political and institutional 
influences and companies’ business strategies (GEREFFI and KORZENIEWICZ 1994, 
GEREFFI et al. 2005). 
The GVC approach focuses on three decisive points: Complexity of transactions; 
codifiability of information; and capability of suppliers. These technical influences can 
be dealt with by various forms of organization, in which the organization can be 
controlled in-house or by external institutions. The GVC theory places emphasis not 
only on a complete handling of the value creation chain through markets and companies 
but also on solutions provided by networks. If, for example, suppliers prove to be 
particularly capable, then they will supply a complete solution to the original equipment 
manufacturers in their sector, and modular value chains will develop. On the other 
hand, if the end product manufacturers show a great deal of expertise, captive value 
chains form which, in turn, characterize the position of the suppliers. Finally, a 
“stalemate” between the position of suppliers and end product manufacturers make 
relational value chains possible as well. 
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The GVC approach also shows that the problem posed by vertical integration cannot 
only be formulated in terms of proprietary rights. If companies exercise power through 
their position in the value chain, then they have no formal proprietary interests in the 
other companies but, all the same they can generate extra profits through exercising this 
power. Despite all the differences in the finer details, the transaction cost approach and 
the GVC approach both have something in common: They both support the idea that 
the reason for the value chain configuration is to be found in technical and 
organizational factors. The GVC approach focuses even more closely on the element of 
organization and also advocates a broader interpretation of the concept of an 
institution. What can, however, be seen in both theories is that, in a given sector, a fixed 
set of techniques and organizational influences are put to use and, in each case, an 
economically efficient and spatially economic solution presents itself. The reasoning 
behind both theories is microeconomics-oriented. Although social institutions can play 
an important role, a macroeconomic level of operation does not seem necessary. 
In the case of the steel industry considered here, however, there is evidence of different 
vertical integration strategies in companies in industrialised countries and companies in 
emerging economies.  My central argument in the empirical part of this essay is that this 
can be attributed to the different macroeconomic growth rates in these countries.  
Consequently, a link is necessary between vertical integration and macroeconomic 
development.  This is perhaps best provided by FRANÇOIS PERROUX’S Theory of 
Sectoral Polarisation and ANDREAS PREDÖHL’S Theory of Economic Development.   
The theory of sectoral polarization draws attention especially to the strategic importance 
of economic interlacing (PERROUX 1964; BUTTLER et. al. 1977). Sectors with particularly 
marked forward and backward integration are seen as the key sectors of an economy as, 
by their development, they have a stimulative effect on the intertwined sectors. They 
may be regarded as motor units if they are of a quantitatively significant size and have a 
growth rate above the average of the economy. PERROUX’S sectoral polarization theory 
draws attention to the cumulative effects between intertwined sectors. When a 
cumulative upward trend begins, it seems rational to vertically integrate the upstream 
and downstream units on the basis of the motor units, because the positive growth 
effects can be internalized in this case. Since this does not exist in an economic 
environment that tends to be stagnant, this incentive to vertically integrate does not 
apply. PREDÖHL’S theory of economic development provides further information in 
addition to these statements concerning the polarization theory (PREDÖHL 1971). This 
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approach, which was developed in the German-speaking countries and became 
widespread in the 1960s (cf. HEIN 2003), has two additional clarification elements. First 
of all, the theory is not confined to nation states; instead it is based on a definition of 
the economic area. In other words, on an area that, in spatial terms, is made up of the 
relevant economic intertwining of companies. The factors determining intertwining 
levels are based on transport costs, the availability of suitable work skills and the 
demand for consumer goods and investment goods. An economic area is then 
constituted when the companies within the area are more closely interlinked with each 
other than with companies outside this area. In each case, an industrial core area 
develops that is structured by a centre and outlying core areas and surrounded by a 
periphery. The vertical integration strategies extend from the economic areas in the 
centre and taper off towards the periphery. In this context, the "integration argument" 
propounded by the polarization theory can be applied to economic integration across 
several countries. The cumulative development in a discrete economic area is of decisive 
importance for the companies located in that area. As a result, corporate strategies in the 
East Asia-Pacific economic area, with China as the industrial centre, peripheral cores 
such as India and peripheral countries such as Australia can differentiate themselves 
from other economic areas (HILPERT 1998). A second clarification element takes the 
historic development of the global economy into account. The development of each 
economic area is an event in a chain of historical events and changes the hierarchical 
structure of the global economy in each case. The Industrial Revolution led to the 
development of the north-western European economic area with Great Britain at its 
centre. During the 20th century, first the American and then the Japanese economic 
areas developed, which marked a transition to a tricentric global economy (PREDÖHL 
1962). Accordingly, the formation of the new East Asia-Pacific economic area means 
that China is becoming the new hegemonic power – and a multicentric order is created. 
These historical shifts in the hegemonic structure of the global economy also mean that 
vertical integration strategies are not applied simultaneously in all economic areas. The 
emergence of new, core industrial areas that are taking over the leadership of the global 
economy is, of necessity, characterised by intensive forward and backward integration.  
On the other hand, old core industrial areas that are losing their importance may be 
tending towards sectoral disintegration.  
PERROUX‘S polarisation theory and PREDÖHL’S development theory provide a 
framework by which the differentiating corporate strategies in the same industry, but in 
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different economic areas, can be explained. Here vertical integration is both a cause and 
a consequence of high rates of economic growth. The power of this frame of reference 
is in the inclusion of these macroeconomic circumstances as a factor for vertical 
integration. This way, the transaction cost approach and the global value chain approach 
can be extended in a way that makes good sense. In the following, the value of such an 
extension will be shown on the basis of the steel industry and its various integration 
strategies in Europe and Asia.  
3. Recent trends in the steel industry 
Steel has been, and still is, a crucial commodity for industrialization and for 
industrialized countries. Despite the discoveries of alternative materials (e.g., lighter 
materials such as aluminium and plastic in the motor vehicle industry), which have been 
made over the last few decades, steel consumption has continued to grow worldwide. 
Consumption has increased from 773 million tons of crude steel in 1998 to 1,317 
million tons of crude steel in 2007, the year before the economic crisis. The Asian 
region was the largest driver of growth, quantitatively at least, increasing its 
consumption from 303 to 707 million tons of crude steel in 2007. Increases in 
consumption were also seen in industrial regions such as the 15 old member states of 
the European Union, with increases from 155 to 181 million tons of crude steel in the 
same period. Globally considered, this increase is due to population growth and to 
continuous industrialization, reflected in an increasing consumption per capita. 
Worldwide consumption increased from 139 kilograms of crude steel equivalents per 
capita in 1998 to 214 kilograms of crude steel equivalents per capita in 2007. The only 
region in the world where the consumption of crude steel has clearly decreased is North 
America with a drop from 375 kilograms of crude steel equivalents to 315 kilograms of 
crude steel equivalents per capita in 2007. In contrast, the consumption of crude steel 
per capita in China has more than tripled from 98 kilograms to 321 kilograms. Whereas 
the consumption of steel in the old industrial countries is likely to decrease over the 
next two decades, the consumption in China is expected to continue increasing over this 
period and not fall again until after 20 years. 
Worldwide crude steel production has almost doubled from 715 million tons in 1980 to 
1,351 million tons in 2007. In the two subsequent years, production experienced a slight 
decrease. The global picture shows that a dynamic development was put in motion in 
the 1990s. Worldwide steel production increased modestly between 1980 and 1992. The 
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shares in production made by Europe, North America and the Soviet Union (or rather, 
its subsequent states) decreased in this period slightly from 71% to 61%. Between then 
and 2009, while the production of steel increased by a further 66%, the shares made up 
of the three regions mentioned above decreased to 37% in 2009. In contrast, Asia (and 
in particular, China) were able to increase their share enormously, with China increasing 
its production sevenfold to 568 million tons. A particularly notable point is the 
increasing production in China throughout the last two years, allowing China to increase 
its share to almost half of world production during, and in spite of, the period of 
economic crisis. As early as 1996, China overtook Japan and the USA, the then leading 
steel-producing nations, and since then this gap has continuously increased. Japan and 
the USA still rank second and third respectively. In that year, they were followed by 
Russia, India, and South Korea. Figure 1 summarizes the production of steel in the 
European Union (198 million tons), showing Germany on top as traditionally the 
biggest producer. Germany reached a production of 45 million tons in 2008. It is 
followed by Italy, France and Great Britain, inside the European Union. Over the last 
couple of years, the new players outside of Europe have been Brazil and Turkey. 
Figure 1: Crude Steel Production in leading countries in million metric tons in 2008 
Source: World Steel Association 
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The changing market and production structures have also given a new impetus to the 
structures of the sector at a corporate level. Because of sensitivity regarding freight 
costs, the steel industry is a regionally diversified industry. Furthermore, there is a strong 
regime of political regulation, which for many decades has ensured companies’ national 
sales markets. The growth surge of the Asian markets has resulted in the appearance of 
some new faces on the global market stage. In 1998 the list of the 20 biggest companies 
included the names of two Chinese companies (Baoshan, Anshan) and one Indian 
company (SAIL), who managed to score in the last couple of places on the list. Ten 
years later, steel companies from the emerging nations dominate the list. China is 
represented by seven companies, India by two companies and there is even a Brazilian 
company on the list. The biggest European steel companies are the Italian Riva group 
(number 16) and the German ThyssenKrupp group (number 18).  
 
Table 1: Top 20 steel producers 2008 
No. Company (Country) Output
* 
 No
. 
Company (Country) Output
* 
1 Arcelor Mittal 
(Luxemburg/India)  
103,3  11 Shandong Steel Group (China) 21,8 
2 Nippon Steel (Japan)  36,9  12 Nucor (USA)  20,4 
3 Baosteel (China)  35,4  13 Gerdau (Brazil)  20,4 
4 POSCO (South Korea)  34,7  14 Severstal (Russia) 19,2 
5 Hebei Steel Group (China) 33,3  15 Evraz (Russia )  17,7 
6 JFE Steel (Japan) 33  16 Riva (Italy)  16,9 
7 Wuhan Steel Group (China) 27,7  17 Angang Steel (China)   16 
8 Tata Steel (India)  24,4  18 ThyssenKrupp (Germany) 16 
9 Jiangsu Shagang Group (China)  23,3  19 Maanshan Steel (China)  15 
10 US Steel (USA)  23,3  20 Sumitomo Metals (Japan)  13,8 
*Million metric tons crude steel 
Source: World Steel Association 
 
The most significant event to arise during the reshaping of the structure of the industry 
was undoubtedly the rise of Mittal Steel, a company which, in 1989 in a highly 
decentralized industry, began to buy up steel plants that were in deficit or situated in 
peripheral regions. This included steel plants in Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, 
Indonesia and Kazakhstan, as well as Canada, the USA and Germany.  A relentless 
policy of rationalization was implemented in all plants, the organization was simplified 
and the operation improved. The company’s goal was to become the lowest-priced 
supplier in every steel market. As a result, Mittal agreed on global strategies of company 
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management, featuring regional limitations to specific markets. After becoming the 
largest steel company in 2005, Mittal merged with the Luxemburg company Arcelor in 
2006. Ever since, ArcelorMittal has been by far the largest steel company worldwide. It 
reached its provisional peak in 2007 with a production of 116 million tons of steel. 
Despite this development, the steel industry is still not a highly concentrated industry. In 
2008, the three biggest companies only made 13.2% of worldwide steel turnover, with a 
proportion of just 41.6% being produced by the top 20. Higher values can only be 
found in regional analysis: For example, the three biggest European companies were 
able to increase their share to 44% by 2006 (AMELING 2007a, 25). A continuation of this 
consolidation is to be expected over the coming years. China is the only country which 
shows a different trend, with the market share of the three largest companies only 
totalling 15%. In particular, the Chinese government is beginning to encourage publicly-
owned companies to create synergies by developing larger business units. 
4. Iron ore and the value chain   
The steel value chain can be divided into four stages: First, the acquisition of primary 
resources; second, the production of steel, which can be further divided into the actual 
production of crude steel, reduction to steel, milling and refinement; third, trade and 
fourth, the processing of steel into steel products in the various branches of industry. In 
the first stage, the deployment of resources ratio is based on the process of steel 
production. The leading process is the basic oxygen furnace, which in the past has been 
the method used for two thirds of all crude steel production worldwide. A second  
Figure 2: Value chain steel  
 
Source: own illustration  
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method is the use of an electric arc furnace, which is particularly well suited to the 
recycling of scrap metal. Of course, the proportion of scrap metal recycling in 
established industrial countries is more significant than in emerging nations. This 
practice is responsible for 40% of production in the European Union and 59% in the 
USA. In contrast, in 2007, 91% of steel produced in China was produced using the basic 
oxygen furnace process. This shows that the steel industries in different regions depend 
on different sources of primary materials. 
By weight, the most significant primary materials for production of steel are iron ore, 
scrap metal and coal. Steel plant locations are usually determined by an analysis of the 
optimal transport costs of each of these three materials. With electric arc furnace plants, 
the sourcing area of the scrap metal is more relevant than with basic oxygen furnaces, 
which have locations that are usually closer to the coal sources. Despite the relevance of 
its transport costs, iron ore is also exported in considerable quantities. In 2008, for 
example, 1,722 million tons of iron ore were mined, of which more than half was 
exported. 
Figure 3: Iron ore production in leading countries 2007 (in %) 
   
Source:  U.S. Geological survey minerals yearbook 2007  
The three leading iron ore producers are China, Brazil and Australia. Significant 
amounts are also mined in India, Russia and the Ukraine (figure 3). If the 2007 iron ore 
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shares of China (22%), Australia (17%) and India (11%) are added together, one can see 
that more than half of the worldwide iron ore production took place in these three 
countries. There is a strong correlation between these sources and the centre of a 
dynamic development in the world economy. 
With these vast sources, China is able to secure a large proportion of its domestic steel 
needs using its own iron ore. Although the country was already mining 100 million tons 
of iron ore per year at the turn of the millennium, significant expansion has been made 
to its production (WORLD STEEL ASSOCIATION 2010, 109-114). In 2008, 366 million 
tons of iron ore were mined, yet for seven years imports of iron ore exceeded this 
volume. China’s import vacuum is one of the main reasons for the leaps in iron ore 
prices over the last few years. There are few substitutes for iron ore, meaning that the 
demand does not fluctuate proportionately to price. Between 2005 and 2008, the iron  
ore price index rose more than 500 points compared with 2000 (figure 4). Until recently, 
iron ore was not traded in spot markets on any significant scale; the price was negotiated 
and set in year-long contracts. Ever since 2000, when Rio Tinto took over the 
Australian mining company North Ltd, and 2000 and 2001 when Vale (formerly  
Figure 4: Price indices for mineral raw material, iron ore and consumer prices 2000 – 
2010 
 
 * BGR-Price Index for mineral raw materials. Source: Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources. Source for consumer price index: Federal Statistical Office of Germany.  
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Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) bought up various mining companies in Brazil, the 
market has been oligopolistic. The three iron ore suppliers Vale, Rio Tinto and BHP 
Billiton represent more than 70% of the world market; and this situation could become 
more serious, given the cooperation agreement made between BHP Billiton and Rio 
Tinto with regard to iron ore. As a result of this process, increases in the price of iron 
ore were misaligned with those of other commodities in 2007/2008 (HUMPHREYS 2009). 
However, since then, the price has fallen again quite quickly. At the beginning of 2010, 
the price of iron ore was still about 300 index points higher than at the beginning of 
2005. A comparison with consumer prices shows what a commodities boom this was. 
In the same period, consumer prices were rising at an average of a little over 1 point per 
year. Sharp increases in iron ore prices are expected again for this year, 2010 (BLAS 
2010a). Meanwhile, the Japanese steel companies Nippon Steel, Sumitomo Metals and 
Kobe have agreed to price contracts for a quarter, which could herald the end of a 
system which has been intact for 40 years (MURPHY, A. et al. 2010; BLAS 2010b).  
5. Backward integration in emerging economies   
The development of the iron ore market indicates that a secure, long-term supply of 
inexpensive iron ore has become a key factor for every steel producer. In theory, there 
are two alternatives available to companies. They can continue to secure their supply in 
an oligopolistic market where more bargaining power and political initiatives aimed at a 
broader supply structure are necessary, or they can embark on a route of backward 
integration and attempt to secure their iron ore supply by buying or establishing their 
own iron ore mines. The second strategy can be observed in its operation in emerging 
countries, especially in China. The main location, which China has in its sights for 
fuelling its policy of expansion of iron ore supply security, is Western Australia. About 
90% of Australia’s exported iron ore makes its way to China by ship (WEDIG and 
KAISER 2009, 486). A dozen large acquisitions of mining companies or entries into joint 
ventures regarding mining projects were carried out by Chinese companies in 2008 and 
2009 (Table 2). Eight such projects had to do with iron ore. The largest acquisition last 
year was the interest in the Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (to the tune of US $ 400 
Million) made by Hunan Hualing Iron & Steel Group Co.   
One of the active companies is the Baosteel Group Corporation, China’s largest steel 
company and the world’s third largest steel producer, with an annual production of 35.4 
million tons of crude steel. This Shanghai-based company was established in 1978 and 
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Table 2: Main acquisitions of Chinese Companies in Australia 2008 and 2009 
Completion 
Month 
Buyer Share Target Resource 
Sept. 2009 China Nonferrous Metal 
Mining (Group) Co., Ltd 
51,6 % Lynas Corp Ltd. Rare Earths 
Sept. 2009 Guangdong Nuclear Power 
Holding Co. Ltd. 
70 % Energy Metals Ltd. Uranium 
Sept. 2009 Railways Materials Corp 12,0 % FerrAus Iron Ore 
Sept. 2009 Railways Materials Corp 11,4 % United Mineral Corp. Iron Ore 
August 2009 Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. 100 % Felix Resources Ltd. Coal 
August 2009 Baosteel   15% Aquila Resources Iron Ore, Coal, 
Manganese 
May 2009 Anshan Iron and Steel Group 36,2 % Gindalbie Metals Iron Ore 
March 2009 Hunan Hualing Iron &  
Steel Group Co Ltd 
17,3 % Fortescue Metals 
Group Ltd. 
Iron Ore 
Feb. 2009 Shenzhen Zhongjin Lingnan 
Nonfemet 
50,1 % Perilya Zinc 
Sept. 2008 Sinosteel Corp. 49,9 % Murchison Metals Ltd. Iron Ore 
Sept. 2008 Sinosteel Corp. 100 % Midwest Corp. Iron Ore 
Feb. 2008 Chinalco   9 % Rio Tinto plc.     Iron Ore 
Sources: www.reuters.com 8 September 2009: Chinese investments in Australian resources; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers: Metal Deals - Forging Ahead 2009 Annual Review.  
expanded into a new dimension in 1998 with the takeover of Shanghai’s Metallurgical 
Holding Group Corporation and Meishan Group Co Ltd. The Chinese government has 
a 77% stake in Baosteel. The company is mainly active in the acquisition of primary 
resources through its subsidiary, Baosteel Resources Co Ltd and Rizhao Baoxin Mining 
& Resource Co Ltd, which mines limestone and dolomite. In addition to this, it owns 
Shanghai Baosteel Steel Resources Co Ltd and Shanghai Xinhua Steel Co Ltd, which 
provide scrap metal. In Australia, the company is represented by its subsidiary, Baosteel 
Australia Mining Company Pty Ltd. The subsidiary company, which was established in 
2002, is based in Perth, Australia, and manages the company’s interests in the Hamslay 
Iron Ore Mine, Australia and Fortescue Metals Group Ltd, as well as other mines.   
In August 2009, Baosteel acquired a 15% stake in the Australian company, Aquila 
Resources for US $ 285 million. This acquisition included a strategic cooperation 
agreement concerning the supply of iron ore, coal and manganese. In addition to its 
Australian acquisitions, Baosteel also invests in Brazilian mines. The acquisition of the 
company Itaminas Comercio de Minerios for US$ 1.2 billion took place in March 2010. 
In this context, Lejiang Xu, Chairman of Baosteel, announced a further offensive with 
regard to the acquisition of iron ore mines:  “China will more frequently look for new 
overseas mineral resources, invest in mining and participate in the international strategic 
layout of the industrial chain, such as the acquisition of mines and building of new steel 
mills. In the medium to long term, the shadow of resource monopoly that has shrouded 
the Chinese steel industry will be broken” (SEATRADE ASIA ONLINE 2010). Certainly, 
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this strategy will involve Baosteel and other large Chinese steel producers in acquiring 
smaller fledgling mining companies in Australia such as Atlas Iron or Mount Gibson 
Iron (WEDIG and KAISER 2009, 488). 
Although China is the most active buyer of mining companies on the world market, 
other companies from emerging markets are also involved. Indian steel companies in 
particular are pursuing a strategy of backward integration in their own country, but have 
recently begun to expand into foreign markets. By way of example, the acquisition 
strategy of the Indian company Tata Steel will be explained below. Tata Steel is part of 
the Tata Group, which achieved a total turnover of US $ 70 billion in 2009 and was the 
second largest Indian company. Tata Steel was founded in 1907 and had a workforce of 
80,000 in 2008. Several years ago, Tata Steel launched an internationalization strategy 
and bought the NatSteel Company in 2005, which had steelworks in Thailand, the 
Philippines and Singapore. In 2007, Tata Steel acquired the Anglo-Dutch steel company 
Corus for US € 12.7 billion and became the eighth-largest steel company in the world. 
By expanding into the European market, Tata Steel was imitating the acquisition 
strategy of Mittal and – after ArcelorMittal – is now the second-largest geographically 
diversified steel company in the world. The company is headquartered in Mumbai, and 
steel production continues to be focused in the region of origin, the Indian state of 
Jharkhand (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Locations of Tata Steel 
Source: Tata Steel 
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Tata Steel has always been a company that unified the value chain stages of iron ore 
extraction and steel production. The discovery of iron ore in the Indian state of 
Jharkhand in 1993 was the cue for the company to establish the first steelworks on 
Indian soil, with coal being extracted in the neighbouring state of Orissa. Since that 
time, Tata Steel has always owned iron ore mines. Today, these mines are located in 
Noamundi, Joda and Katamati in the states of Jharkhand and Orissa. Additionally, two 
coal mines in Jharkhand and a manganese mine in Orissa are currently also in operation. 
Through Hooghly Met Coke & Power Company Ltd., a joint venture with the West 
Bengal Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., Tata Steel obtains 1.2 million tons of 
coke per annum. Coal, the raw material used by this plant, is obtained from various 
mines in Australia, Canada and Indonesia. Tata Steel set up the joint venture S&T 
Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. together with the Indian state-owned enterprise, the Steel 
Authority of India Ltd. in order to acquire and develop new domestic coalfields. 
In recent years, Tata Steel has also begun to set up overseas projects for the purpose of 
developing raw material fields. A project with the state-owned Ivory Coast mining 
company, Sodemi, is used to supply iron ore. In November 2009, Tata Steel had an 80 
% participation in a port project of the New Millennium Capital Corp., which owns an 
iron ore field in the Canadian provinces of Newfoundland & Labrador and Quebec. 
The agreement also stipulates that Tata Steel will purchase the entire output of the ore 
mines. 
Table 3: Joint ventures of Tata Steel for the purpose of procuring raw materials  
Completio
n Month 
Partner Share Project Resource 
November 
2007 
Joint Venture with Riversdale 
Mining Ltd. (Australia) 
35 % Mine Benga, Tete 
(Mozambique) 
Coal 
December 
2007 
Joint Venture with Sodemi (Ivory 
Coast)  
Unknow
n  
Mount Nimba, Ivory 
Coast  
Iron Ore 
January 2008 JV Al Rimal Mining LLC and Al 
Bahja Group (Sultanate of Oman  
70 % Uyun Limestone 
deposits at Salalah in the 
Sultanate of Oman 
 Limestone 
May 2008 Vale (Brazil)  5 % Carborough Downs 
(Queensland, Australia) 
Coal 
November 
2009 
New Millennium 
Capital Corp (Canda) 
80 % Direct Shipping Ore 
Project for Millennium 
Iron Range (Canada) 
Iron Ore 
Source: www.reuters.com, 8 September 2009: Chinese investments in Australian resources. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers: Metal Deals - Forging Ahead 2009 Annual Review. 
The "Dhamra Port" infrastructure project is a slightly different and especially striking 
project set up by Tata Steel to ensure further supply of raw materials. It has been 
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operating since 1999 and is a joint venture between Tata Steel and the Indian 
engineering company Larsen & Toubro Limited (L&T), with each company holding a 
50% stake. The core of the project is a deep-sea port at the mouth of the river Dhamra 
in the Indian state of Orissa. The port is designed to handle a capacity of 80 million tons 
per annum. The first ship was already able to dock there in February 2010. Backup 
facilities will also be created for handling coal, limestone and iron ore.  62 kilometres of 
railway tracks to the nearest rail connection at Bhardak are to be constructed. 
The broadly ramified activities of Tata Steel in terms of raw materials' supply should be 
viewed in the context of the additional activities carried out by that group. Apart from 
steel production, the company is active in six other business areas for processing steel. 
These are the Agrico Division (Hand Tools), Tata Growth Shop (Mechanical 
Engineering), Tubes Division, Wire Division, Bearings Division as well as the Ferro 
Alloys and Minerals Division. Moreover, steel is processed on a large scale by other 
companies affiliated with the Tata Group. As a purchaser of steel, particular reference 
should be made to Tata Motors, India's biggest automobile company. Additionally a 
series of civil and structural engineering companies are part of the Tata Group. On the 
whole the Tata Group, including its subsidiaries, represents the entire steel value chain 
in an exemplary manner. 
6. A bifurcation of business strategies 
Of the above-mentioned two alternatives, vertical backward integration or supply via 
the market, only the emerging markets vehemently pursue the first strategy. However, if 
one goes back a few decades, this strategy was also pursued by companies in the 
established industrial countries. Today, within the triad, Japanese steel companies 
primarily continue to be heavily involved in mining with corporate investments often 
the result of strong growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the iron deposits of the 
Robe River in Western Australia, which have been exploited since 1972, are operated by 
Pilbara Iron, a joint venture between Rio Tinto (53 %), Mitsui, a Japanese trading 
company, and two Japanese steel companies, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon 
Steel Corporation. As mining activities have steadily increased, Robe River is the largest 
supplier of lower-grade iron ore in the world today. Along with another Japanese 
trading house, Mitsui is also involved in Western Australian mining projects operated by 
BHP Billiton; in the Mt. Newman project since 1967, in the Yandi project since 1990 
and in the Goldworthy project since 2002. In recent years, these projects in Western 
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Australia have been continued partly by the Japanese steel companies and partly by their 
trading companies with Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton. 
The corporate investments of US steel companies are even older and primarily aimed at 
mining regions on the American continent. U. S. Steel, the largest steel company in the 
United States, operates two iron ore mines in Minnesota and has a 14.7 percent 
ownership interest in Hibbing Taconite Company, which also produces iron ore in 
Minnesota. 
On the other hand, European steel companies have taken the former approach over the 
past two decades. Today, they are virtually distancing themselves from an integration 
strategy. During the 1990s, the British, French and German steel companies at the time 
discontinued their existing participations in mining companies. The last German iron 
ore mining company, Ferteco, then the third-largest iron ore producer in Brazil, was 
sold by ThyssenKrupp to Vale in 2001 (DALHEIMER 2001, 6). This was communicated 
as being a useful restriction within the framework of the shareholder value strategy 
which was to create resources for expansion in the core business area. In retrospect, 
DIETER AMELING, then president of the steel trade association, portrayed this as a 
conscious decision by steel producers in Germany to prevent backward integration. 
From his viewpoint, funds were released by the divestment process with which the 
quality of steel could be improved and could be invested in the downstream stages of 
the value chain (AMELING 2007b, 11). Since that time, no purchases of iron ore mines 
have been transacted by German or large European steel companies. In fact, the reverse 
approach of forward integration of the mining industry into the steel industry is more 
readily identifiable. Thus, in 2006, the Brazilian iron ore producer Vale became involved 
in the reconstruction of the Sepetiba steelworks (state of Rio de Janeiro) in Brazil with a 
projected annual capacity of 5 million tons of crude steel. In 2009, its share increased to 
about 27% and production started in the first half of 2010. ThyssenKrupp is the 
operator of the steelworks which supplies the slabs produced at this site for further 
processing at its plants in Germany and the USA. As a strategy, at the beginning of the 
raw materials crisis in 2007, the German steel industry recommended that the efficiency 
of production processes be improved and steel scrap be returned to the production 
cycle to a greater degree (AMELING 2007b, 12). At the same time, competition law 
initiatives to combat any further concentration process in the mining industry were 
intensified. However, the issue is not high on the political agenda as EU institutions 
themselves state: “(…) there has been no integrated policy response at EU level up to 
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now to ensure that it has sufficient access to raw materials at fair and undistorted 
prices” (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 2008, 5). Just how little can be 
achieved with this strategy is reflected in the recent round of negotiations regarding steel 
prices. The current president of the Steel Trade Association, HANS JÜRGEN KERKHOFF, 
can only issue a warning about imminent new price hikes for iron ore 
(WIRTSCHAFTSVEREINIGUNG STAHL 2010).  
7. Growth and spatial economic integration 
If one considers the current trend towards integration of upstream production phases in 
the steel industry, the above-mentioned theories provide important information about 
the explanation of the value chain. By adopting the transaction cost approach, it is 
possible to show that iron ore supply by steel companies was a frequent and, over the 
last three decades of the 20th century, also a safe transaction. Additionally, the 
specificity of the transaction was not too high. (It should be borne in mind, however, 
that the production process in steelworks is designed for particular types of iron ore and 
can only be converted at a high cost). Given this situation, advantages accrued from 
procurement through the market. On the other hand, the sharp increase in demand for 
iron ore since 2005 and the subsequent price hikes have increased the insecurity of the 
transaction enormously and have given rise to vertical integration. The changes can also 
be demonstrated by using the global value chain theory, according to which this is a 
producer-driven value chain. Producer-driven value chains are usually dominated by 
large producers with a high intensity of capital and technology (GEREFFI and 
KORZENIEWICZ 1994). If one looks at the factors that have an impact on governance, 
then a lot can be said for organization through the markets: In the steel industry, the 
complexity of transactions is mostly low, the ability to codify transactions is mostly high 
and the capability of the suppliers used to be low. However, the relative scarcity of iron 
ore has shifted the distribution of power in the value chain in favour of the iron ore 
producers. It can also be used to explain why the mining companies may opt for 
forward integration if the steel producers believe they are incapable of backward 
integration, such as in the participation of Vale in the ThyssenKrupp's steelworks in 
Brazil. However, both theoretical approaches focus on a set of techniques and 
organizational influences that create an economically efficient solution. While the trend 
towards hikes in demand and prices affects all companies, the significant differences 
between strategies in the industrialized nations and the emerging markets in relation to 
these approaches cannot be understood via these approaches. An initial attempt at 
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clarification can draw attention to the cultural differences between the corporate 
strategies. In his study of the iron ore market over a long period, SUKAGAWA (2010, 58) 
observed a tendency on the part of the Japanese towards safe supply, stable prices and 
long-term business relationships. By contrast, European companies always tended to 
adopt solutions through anonymous markets. Chinese companies, too, require a high 
degree of stability, cooperation and trust. Furthermore, these are usually companies that 
are heavily controlled by the state. However, this cultural approach falls short, 
particularly in relation to the dramatic appearance of Chinese companies on the world 
market for iron ore after 2005. The combined factors of an enormous rise in crude steel 
production and consumption in China is certainly the decisive economic variable that 
has resulted in corporate strategies being modified. This industry growth should be 
viewed in the light of macroeconomic growth both in China and the emerging markets. 
In China, average increase in gross domestic product was 9.6 % from 2000 to 2009 and 
6.9 % in India, while the developed economies of the USA, Japan and the Euro zone 
grew at a rate of 1.7 (IMF 2009). Even in the previous crisis year of 2009, the Chinese 
economy grew at a rate of 6.5% and the Indian economy at a rate of 4.5%. As a result of 
this strong economic dynamism, companies in the emerging markets are, firstly, able to 
realize higher profits that are available for investments. Secondly, future economic 
prospects are much better, which has a positive impact on a willingness to invest and to 
issue loans.  Thirdly, the different economic sectors mutually impact on each other, 
thereby resulting in a cumulative upward trend.  
This economic momentum is the reason why the current challenges can be successfully 
met through a strategy of vertical integration in China and India. A theoretical link 
between economic performance and vertical integration is first provided by the 
polarisation theory. In China, to use PERROUX’S terminology, the heavy industries along 
with numerous export-oriented consumer goods industries have become the drivers for 
growth.  The steel industry, as an industry that is both a supplier of raw materials and an 
independent exporter, is also involved in this growth process. This trend has also 
radiated out to affect the iron ore mining industry. As an upstream sector, with its 
current shortages and price levels, it presents special risks for the steel industry.    
For goods that are liable to transport costs, such integration can be achieved with even 
greater ease if there is only a short distance between the sectors to be integrated. 
Secondly, PREDÖHL’S theory of economic development provides for this spatial 
economic aspect.  In fact, in the case of the steel industry, there are large stocks of iron 
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ore in the production countries of China and India. This simplifies the economic, legal 
and cultural conditions for integration.  The industrial core of the Chinese steel industry 
integrates the industrial periphery of mining locations in this way. In the case of India, 
as the most significant peripheral core of the new economic area, steel works can often 
be built directly in the vicinity of the iron ore mines. The third country that has found 
large deposits of iron ore is Australia, which can supply East Asia with economical 
transport costs. Here also, conditions exist that promote vertical integration, or the 
integration of Australia in the newly-emerging Asia-Pacific economic area.  
The current rise of new globally acting companies and their strategies of vertical 
integration are an expression of this new block formation. Thus, the theory of economic 
integration demonstrates that vertical integration should also be understood as a 
concomitant occurrence of a historically new phase in the global economy which is 
certainly set to last for decades.  
Two conditions are missing in Europe for a similar vertical integration strategy to 
develop: On the one hand, there is no similar growth process in the steel market and, on 
the other hand, the current production facilities are located a long way away from the 
European economic area. Consequently, under these macroeconomic and spatial 
economic conditions, the European steel industry is at a considerable disadvantage 
when it comes to ensuring supplies of raw materials in the form of iron ore.    
 
8. Conclusion 
In the wake of a global rise in the cost of raw materials in 2007/08, a new trend in 
corporate organization is appearing within the steel industry. Leading companies in this 
sector are hugely involved in upstream stages of iron ore production as well as other raw 
materials such as coal, limestone and steel stabilizer. This process is primarily discernible 
among companies in China, but also in other emerging markets. By contrast, this 
strategy is scarcely discernible in the steel companies of the established industrial 
countries of the USA, Japan and European nations. In Germany, companies and 
associations currently denounce any integration of upstream value chain stages in no 
uncertain terms. 
Normally, contemporary economic geography treats the problem of vertical integration 
by adopting two theoretical approaches. The transaction cost approach explains the 
22 
degree of vertical integration through security, frequency and specificity of transactions. 
Due to increasing insecurity regarding the supply of raw materials, the integration of 
iron ore producers can therefore be considered as a more cost-effective strategy. 
Similarly, the global value chain theory – which explains the distribution of power in the 
value chain in terms of the complexity of transactions, codifiability of information and 
capability of suppliers – may be applied to substantiate increasing vertical backward 
integration. From this viewpoint, the power of the raw production phase increases and 
results in a new configuration of the value chain. However, these approaches can 
scarcely explain the development of different corporate strategies in the established 
industrial countries, particularly in Europe, compared with the strategies adopted in the 
emerging markets. Using the example of the leading Chinese steel producer, Baosteel, 
and the second-largest Indian producer, Tata Steel, their expansion was traced to the 
raw materials sector, consisting of the purchase of mining companies, joint ventures for 
developing iron ore mines, and investments in transport infrastructure. The bifurcation 
of corporate strategies can only be understood if the different macroeconomic 
conditions in the respective economic areas are taken into account. This paper has dealt 
with this aspect by referring to FRANÇOIS PERROUX'S polarization theory, which focuses 
on the stimulative effects of economic sectors on upstream and downstream value 
added stages. With higher growth rates, stronger stimulative effects are to be expected, 
which result in greater incentives to integrate if the supply of raw materials is not secure. 
Further statements may be made by referring to the related theory of spatial economic 
development as propounded by ANDREAS PREDÖHL. In this context, attention is drawn 
to the spatial economic dimension of intertwining effects. From this viewpoint, a new 
East Asian-Pacific economic area is merging with China at its centre, outlying core areas 
such as India, and peripheral countries such as Australia. With ownership integration 
occurring in this region, current events reflect what happens when other economic areas 
begin to emerge. The conglomerates of steel producers and mining companies that are 
currently emerging in China, India and Australia are concomitants of a new global 
economic configuration. The theory of spatial economic development can be applied to 
take the different trade activities of companies, in East Asia and in Europe for example, 
into account. While business-related theories such as the transaction cost approach and 
the global value chain approach only take the technical organizational criteria into 
account, these different macroeconomic frameworks may also be used to explain 
diverging attitudes towards vertical integration. This theoretical perspective also implies 
a new view of the trading strategies being discussed in Europe. Above all, a discussion at 
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political level is being mooted in this context, based on the assumption of blocking 
global free trade. On the other hand, for spatial economic reasons, it has to be assumed 
that there is a much greater degree of economic rationalisation. In the East Asian-
Pacific economic area, a corporate strategy determined by spatial economic 
considerations is now being adopted, similar to that pursued at the time of the 
emergence of the North-western European economic area and other economic zones. 
Economic geography now faces the tasks of proving itself, primarily by showing the 
extent of its spatial economic integration and by providing an analysis of this – one that 
is free of any illusions.  
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